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Inthispaper,weestablishanaxiomaticallyfoundedgeneralizedrecursivesmooth
ambiguity model that allows for a separation among intertemporal substitution,
risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. We axiomatize this model using two ap-
proaches: the second-order act approach à la Klibanoff et al. (2005) and the two-
stage randomization approach à la Seo (2009). We characterize risk attitude and
ambiguity attitude within these two approaches. We then discuss our model’s ap-
plication in asset pricing. Our recursive preference model nests some popular
models in the literature as special cases.
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1. Introduction
The rational expectations hypothesis is a workhorse assumption in macroeconomics
and ﬁnance. However, it rules out ambiguity-sensitive behavior. In addition, it faces se-
rious difﬁculties when confronted with experimental evidence (Ellsberg 1961) or asset
markets data (Hansen and Singleton 1983 and Mehra and Prescott 1985). Since Gilboa
and Schmeidler’s (1989)a n dSchmeidler’s (1989) seminal contributions, there is a grow-
ing body of literature that develops theoretical models of decision making under am-
biguity.1 In addition, there is also a growing body of literature that applies these util-
ity models to ﬁnance and macroeconomics.2 This literatures demonstrates that these
models are useful for explaining many economic phenomena.
In this paper, we establish an axiomatically founded generalized recursive smooth
ambiguity model that allows for a separation among intertemporal substitution, risk
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aversion, and ambiguity aversion.3 An axiomatic foundation is important because
the choice-based assumptions on preferences make the model testable in principle.
We axiomatize our model using two approaches: the second-order act approach à la
Klibanoff et al. (henceforth KMM) (2005) and the two-stage randomization approach à
la Seo (2009). We characterize risk attitude and ambiguity attitude within these two ap-
proaches. We then apply our model to asset pricing and derive its pricing kernel using a
homotheticspeciﬁcation. Weshowthatanambiguityaverseagentattachesmoreweight
on the pricing kernel when his continuation value is low in a recession. This feature
generates countercyclical market price of uncertainty and is useful in explaining asset
pricing puzzles(Hansen 2007, Hansenand Sargent2010,a n dJuand Miao forthcoming).
Our dynamic model is built on the static smooth ambiguity model developed by












 c :S → R+  (1)
where S is the state space, P is a set of probability measures on S, μ is a probability mea-
sure over P, u describes risk attitude, and v ◦ u−1 describes ambiguity attitude. The set
P reﬂects model uncertainty or the decision maker’s ambiguity about the “true” distri-
bution of consumption. This model permits a separation between ambiguity and am-
biguity attitude, and allows smooth, rather than kinked, indifference curves. Both fea-
tures are conceptually important and empirically useful. In addition, KMM (2005)s h o w
that this model includes the multiple-priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)a s
a special case when ambiguity aversion goes to inﬁnity under some technical regularity
conditions.
Embedding their static model in a dynamic environment, KMM (2009a) develop
a recursive smooth ambiguity preference model. This dynamic model suffers from a
limitation that intertemporal substitution and attitudes toward risk or uncertainty are
intertwined. This inﬂexibility limits its empirical applications and makes compara-
tive statics of risk aversion hard to interpret.5 For example, calibrating this model in
a representative–agent consumption-based asset-pricing setting, Ju and Miao (2007)
showthatsomewhatimplausibleparametervaluesareneededtoexplaintheequitypre-
mium puzzle. By contrast, after separating out intertemporal substitution as in our gen-
eralized recursive smooth ambiguity model, Ju and Miao (forthcoming) show that the
empirical performance improves signiﬁcantly.
We summarize our preference model when restricted to the space of adapted con-
sumption processes as follows. Consider an inﬁnite-horizon setting and denote time by
3Roughly speaking, risk refers to situations where known probabilities are available to guide choices,
while ambiguity refers to situations where probabilities are vague so that multiple probabilities may be
available. Ambiguity aversion means that individuals dislike ambiguity.
4For alternative axiomatizations of an essentially identical functional form, see Chew and Sagi (2008),
Ergin and Gul (2009), Nau (2006), and Seo (2009).
5See Epstein and Zin (1989) for an early discussion of the importance of the separation between in-
tertemporal substitution and risk aversion in a pure risk setting.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 425
t = 0 1 2    . The state space in each period is S.A tt i m et, the decision maker’s infor-
mation consists of histories st ={ s1 s2     st} with s0 ∈ S given and st ∈ S. The decision
maker ranks adapted consumption plans c = (ct)t≥0.T h a ti s ,ct is a measurable function














where Vst(c) isconditionalutilityorcontinuationvalueathistory st, W :R2 → R isatime
aggregator, Pst is a set of one-step-ahead probability measures on S at history st,a n d
μst is a probability measure over Pst. The measure μst represents second-order beliefs
about distributions governing one-step-ahead resolution of uncertainty. Given some
assumptions similar to those in KMM (2009a), we show that μst is obtained by Bayesian
updating from an initial prior.
When the set Pst consists of a set of conditional likelihood distributions πz(·|st) in-














where μst(z) is the posterior distribution of z given st. More generally, the learning
model in (3) allows z to be a hidden state that follows a Markov process because Pst
can be history dependent.
Our generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model nests some popular models in
t h el i t e r a t u r ea ss p e c i a lc a s e s .
• ThesubjectiveversionoftherecursiveexpectedutilitymodelofKrepsandPorteus
(1978)a n dEpstein and Zin (1989) is obtained by setting v = u in (2). In this case,






This is the standard Bayesian approach that rules out ambiguity-sensitive behav-
ior. If we further set v(x) = u(x) =−exp(−x/θ), we obtain the multiplier prefer-
encemodelortherisk-sensitivitymodeldiscussedinHansenandSargent(2001).6
Here θ is a robustness parameter, which enhances risk aversion.
• The generalized recursive multiple-priors model of Hayashi (2005) is obtained as
the limit of (2) under some technical regularity conditions when ambiguity aver-
6This multiplier model is dynamically consistent according to the standard deﬁnition and the deﬁnition
in this paper. Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2007b) also propose several other models of robustness. Some of
them, e.g., “constraint preferences,” are dynamically inconsistent according to the standard deﬁnition as
pointed out by Epstein and Schneider (2003). However, the constraint preferences satisfy a different notion
of dynamic consistency deﬁned in Section 19.4 of Hansen and Sargent (2007b, pp. 407–412).426 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)












This model nests the recursive multiple-priors model of Epstein and Wang (1994)
andEpsteinandSchneider(2003)asaspecialcase,asdiscussedinHayashi (2005).
• The recursive smooth ambiguity model of KMM (2009a) has a discounted aggre-












Theconcavityof φ characterizesambiguityaversion. Thecurvatureof u describes
both intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. Thus, they are intertwined.
• The multiplier preference model with hidden states of Hansen (2007)a n d
Hansen and Sargent (2007a) is obtained by setting W( c y)= h(c) + βy, u(x) =
−exp(−x/θ1),a n dv(x) =−exp(−x/θ2), θ1 θ2 > 0,i n( 3). In this model, there
are two risk-sensitivity adjustments. The ﬁrst risk-sensitivity adjustment for the
distribution πz(·|st) reﬂects the decision maker’s concerns about the misspeciﬁ-
cation in the conditional distribution given the parameter value z.T h e s e c o n d
risk-sensitivity adjustment for the distribution μst reﬂects the decision maker’s
concerns about the misspeciﬁcation of the posterior distribution.
Toprovideanaxiomaticfoundationforthemodelin(2),weneedtochooseasuitable
domain for preferences. As is well known from Kreps and Porteus (1978)a n dEpstein
and Zin (1989), one needs to deﬁne a hierarchical domain of choices so as to separate
intertemporal substitution from risk aversion. In our second-order act approach, we
take the product space of current consumption and the continuation compound lottery
acts as the primary preference domain. Hayashi (2005) ﬁrst introduces the domain of
compound lottery acts to provide an axiomatic foundation for a generalized recursive
multiple-priors model. A compound lottery act is a random variable that maps today’s
state of the world into a joint lottery over current consumption and a compound lottery
act for tomorrow. It is the dynamic counterpart of the horse-race roulette-wheel act
introduced by Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
Ourﬁrstaxiomaticcharacterizationconsistsofﬁvestandardaxiomstodeliverrecur-
sive expected utility under uncertainty and two additional axioms related to ambiguity.
The ﬁve standard axioms deliver W and u in (2). The two additional axioms deliver v
and μst. To pin down a unique v and a unique μst, weneedmore choicesavailableto the
decision maker. Because μst is a second-order probability measure over the ﬁrst-order
probability measures on S, to elicit this belief, it seems natural and intuitive to assume
that choices contingent on the ﬁrst-order probability measures are observable. These
choices are modelled as second-order acts in KMM (2005) in a static setting. Extending
their insight to our dynamic Anscombe–Aumann setting, we deﬁne a second-order actTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 427
as a mapping that maps a probability measure on S to a compound consumption lot-
tery. We then deﬁne auxiliary preferences over second-order acts and impose an axiom
thatthesepreferencesarerepresentedbysubjectiveexpectedutility. Thisrepresentation
can be delivered by imposing additional primitive axioms from the standard subjective
expected utility theory.7
As in KMM (2005, 2009b), we impose the last axiom that connects preferences over
second-order acts and the original preferences over pairs of current consumption and
continuationcompoundlotteryacts. Indoingso,weintroducethenotionofaone-step-
ahead act—a compound lottery act in which subjective uncertainty resolves in just one
period. We then construct a second-order act associated with a one-step-ahead act that
mapsaprobabilitymeasureonS toacompoundlotteryontheconsumptionspace. This
compound lottery is obtained by averaging out states in the one-step-ahead act using
the probability measure on S. The last axiom says that the decision maker orders pairs
of current consumption and the one-step-aheadact identically to the second-orderacts
associatedwiththeone-step-aheadacts. Theintuitionisthatthedecisionmaker’srank-
ingoftheformerchoicesreﬂectshisuncertaintyabouttheunderlyingdistributionofthe
choices, which is the domain of the second-order acts.
One critique of the KMM (2005) model raised by Seo (2009) is that second-order
acts and preferences over second-order acts are typically unobservable in the ﬁnan-
cial markets. For example, investors typically bet on the realization of stock prices, but
not on the true distribution underlying stock prices. A similar critique applies to the
Anscombe–Aumann acts as well because these acts are also unobservable in ﬁnancial
markets: the realizations of stock prices are monetary values, not lotteries. However,
both Anscombe–Aumann acts and second-order acts are useful modelling devices and
are available from laboratory and thought experiments.8 More concretely, when mea-
sures in Pst correspond to conditional distributions indexed by an unknown parameter
asin(3),thesecond-orderactsarebetsonthevalueoftheparameter. Inanassetpricing
application studied by Ju and Miao (forthcoming), Pst consists of two distributions for
consumption growth in a boom and in arecession so that thesecond-orderacts arebets
on the economic regime. In a portfolio choice application studied by Chen et al. (2009),
Pst consistsoftwodistributionsforthepossiblymisspeciﬁedstockreturnmodelssothat
the second-order acts are simply bets on the statistical model of stock returns.
It is possible to dispense with the auxiliary domain of second-order acts following
Seo’s (2009) axioms. Building on his insight, we provide an alternative axiomatization
for (2) without second-order acts. Adapting Seo’s (2009) static setup, we introduce an
7Ina recentcritique of the staticKMMmodel, Epstein (2010) argues that Ellsbergian choices on S should
lead to Ellsbergian choices for second-order acts. In response, KMM (2009a) argue that second-order acts
are modelling devices to deliver Ellsbergian choices on the state space S of primary interest. To accom-
modate Ellsbergian choices for second-order acts, one can simply expand the state space to incorporate
measures on S.
8To further illustrate this point, we quote Kreps (1988, p. 101): “This procedure of enriching the set of
items to which preference must apply is quite standard. It makes perfectly good sense in normative appli-
cations, as long as the Totrep involved is able to envision the extra objects and agree with the axiom applied
to them. This need be no more than a thought experiment for Totrep, as long as he is willing to say that it is
a valid (i.e., conceivable) thought experiment.”428 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
extra stage of randomization. As a by-product contribution, we construct a set of two-
stage compound lottery acts, which allows for randomization both before and after the
realization of the state of the world. We then deﬁne the product space of current con-
sumption and the continuation lotteries over two-stage compound lottery acts as the
singledomainofpreferences. Weimposeﬁveaxiomsanalogoustotheﬁrstﬁveaxiomsin
the second-order act approach. We replace the last two axioms in that approach with a
ﬁrst-stageindependenceaxiomandadominanceaxiomadaptedfromSeo(2009). Given
these seven axioms, we establish a dynamic version of Seo’s static model. To the best of
our knowledge, our paper provides the ﬁrst dynamic extension of Seo’s static model.
We should mention that each of our two different adopted axiomatic approaches is
debatable. For example, some researchers (e.g., Seo 2009 and Epstein 2010) argue that
second-order acts or preferences on these acts are either unobservable or may not be
totally plausible. In the two-stage randomization approach, a failure of the reduction of
compound lotteries may not be normatively appealing.
After providing axiomatic foundations, we characterize risk attitude and ambigu-
ity attitude. Our characterization in the second-order act approach is similar to that
of KMM (2005), suitably adapted to our dynamic setting with Anscombe–Aumann-type
acts. In this approach, ambiguity aversion is associated with aversion to the variation
of ex ante evaluations of one-step-ahead acts due to model uncertainty. In the two-
stagerandomizationapproach,wedistinguishbetweenattitudestowardrisksinthetwo
stages. We deﬁne absolute ambiguity aversion as an aversion to a ﬁrst-stage mixture of
acts before the realization of the state of the world compared to the second-stage mix-
ture of these acts after the realization of the state. We show that this notion of ambiguity
aversion is equivalent to risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage. In particular, ambiguity aversion
is associated with the violation of reduction of compound lotteries. We also show that in
bothapproaches, risk attitudeandambiguity attitudearecharacterizedbytheshapesof
the functions u and v, respectively.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the atemporal
models of KMM (2005)a n dSeo (2009). Section 3 embeds the KMM (2005)m o d e li n
a dynamic setting and axiomatizes it using the second-order act approach. Section 4
embeds the Seo (2009) model in a dynamic setting and axiomatizes it using the two-
stage randomization approach. Section 5 applies our model to asset pricing. Section 6
discusses related literature. Appendices A–E contain proofs.
2. Review of the atemporal models
In this section, we provide a brief review of the atemporal models of ambiguity pro-
posed by KMM (2005)a n dSeo (2009). We embed these models in a dynamic setting
in Sections 3 and 4. Both atemporal models when restricted to the space of random
consumption deliver an identical representation in (1). The two models differ in do-
main and axiomatic foundation. For both models, we take a complete, transitive, and
continuous preference relation   as given.
Consider the KMM model ﬁrst. KMM originally study Savage acts over S ×[ 0 1],
where the auxiliary state space [0 1] is used to describe objective lotteries. Here weTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 429
translate their model into the Anscombe–Aumann domain. Let S be the set of states,
which is assumed to be ﬁnite for simplicity. Let C be a compact metric space and let
 (C) be the set of lotteries over C.9 An Anscombe–Aumann act is deﬁned as a mapping
g:S →  (C).L e t G denote the set of all such acts. To pin down second-order beliefs,
KMM introduce an auxiliary preference ordering  2 over second-order acts. A second-
order act is a mapping g:P →  (C),w h e r eP ⊂  (S).L e tG2 denote the set of all second-
order acts.















φ(¯ u(g(π)))dμ(π) ∀g ∈ G2 
where φ: ¯ u( (C)) → R is a continuous and strictly increasing function and ¯ u: (C) → R
is a mixture-linear function.10
The previous representation is characterized by the following axioms.11 (i) The pref-
erence   satisﬁes the mixture-independence axiom over the set of constant acts  (C).
(ii) The preference over second-order acts  2 is represented by the subjective expected
utility of Savage (1954). (iii) The two preference relations   and  2 are consistent with
each other in the sense that g   h if and only if g2  2 h2,w h e r eg2 is the second-order
acts associated with g deﬁned by g2(π) =
 
s∈S g(s)π(s)for each π ∈ P and h2 is deﬁned
similarly. The interpretation for the last axiom is the following. If the decision maker
prefers f to g, then the average of f across states over all possible beliefs (distributions)
should also be preferred to that of g. The reverse is also true.
The last two axioms are controversial as argued by Epstein (2010). To illustrate the
plausibility of these axioms, consider the following example. Suppose there is an Ells-
berg urn containing 90 balls. A decision maker is told that there are 30 black balls and
60 white or red balls in the urn. But he does not know the composition of white or red
balls. There are four bets as in Table 1. The Ellsbergian choice is
g1   g2 but g4   g3 
One justiﬁcation is that the decision maker is unsure about the probabilities of white
and red balls and is averse to this ambiguity.
Suppose there are two possible distributions over the set of ball color S ={ b w r}:
π1 = (1/3 2/3 0) and π2 = (1/3 0 2/3). Consider the second-order acts associated with
9We use the following notations and assumptions throughout the paper. Given a compact metric
space Y,l e tB(Y) be the family of Borel subsets of Y and let  (Y) be the set of Borel probability mea-
suresdeﬁnedover B(Y).E n d o w (Y) with the weak convergence topology. Then  (Y) is a compact metric
space.
10Af u n c t i o nf is mixture linear on some set X if f(λx+ (1 − λ)y) = λf (x) + (1 − λ)f(y) for any x y ∈ X
and any λ ∈[ 0 1].
11The proof can be obtained from our proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.430 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
bwr
g1 10 0 0
g2 01 0 0
g3 10 0 10
g4 01 01 0
Table 1. This table shows four acts, g1, g2, g3,a n dg4, with payoffs contingent on three events
{b}, {w},a n d{r}.
π1 π2
g2






4 20/32 0 /3




4, associated with four acts
g1, g2, g3,a n dg4, respectively. Their payoffs are contingent on two distributions π1 and π2.
gi, i = 1     4, g2
i (πj) =
 
s∈{b w r}gi(s)πj(s),w h e r ej = 1 2. We write their payoffs in
Table 2. The previous consistency axiom implies that
g2
1  2 g2
2 but g2
4  2 g2
3 
This behavior can be consistent with expected utility over second-order acts as long as
the decision maker is risk averse, because g2
1 and g2
4 give sure outcomes, but g2
2 and g2
3
are risky bets. The intuition is that second-order acts average out uncertain states (ball
color)bydeﬁnitionandsuchhedgingmayeliminateambiguity(see GilboaandSchmei-
dler 1989). So it is possible that the decision maker is ambiguity neutral for second-
order acts, but ambiguity averse for bets on the Ellsberg urn. Of course, one can de-
sign thought experiments to display Ellsbergian choices for second-order acts, which
are ruled out by the KMM model.
Seo (2009) provides a different axiomatic foundation for (5) by dispensing with the
auxiliary set of second-order acts and the associated preferences over this set. He con-
siders the domain of lotteries over Anscombe–Aumann acts,  (G), and a single prefer-
ence relation   deﬁned over it. Notice that by restricting attention to lotteries over con-
stant acts, we have the domain of two-stage lotteries  ( (C)) as a subset of  (G),a n d
by further making the ﬁrst-stage randomization degenerate, we have  (C) as a subset of
 ( (C)),h e n c eo f (G) too.











dμ(π)dp(g) ∀p ∈  (G)  (6)
12In Seo’s (2009) original representation, he takes P =  (S). When we adapt his dominance axiom for P,
we can allow P to be an arbitrary subset of  (S). For example, the proof in Seo’s appendix gives an example
of a ﬁnite set P.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 431
When p is degenerate at some g ∈ G,( 6) reduces to (5).
In Seo’s approach, the representation is characterized by the following axioms.
(i) The preference   satisﬁes the mixture-independence axiom on the set of one-stage
lotteries (C). (ii)Thepreference satisﬁesthemixture-independenceaxiomontheset
of lotteries over acts  (G). (iii) A dominance condition holds. To state the dominance
axiomformally,wedeﬁneatwo-stagelottery a(p π) ∈  ( (C)) inducedbyp ∈  (G) and
π ∈ P as a(p π)(B) = p({g ∈ G:g2(π) ∈ B}) foranyBorelset B on  (C). Dominancesays
that for any p q ∈  (G), p   q if a(p π)   a(p π) for all π ∈ P. Seo’s approach does
not deliver uniqueness of the second-order belief μ in general. For example, if φ is lin-
ear, then any μ with an identical mean
 
P πdμ( π)yields the same ranking. It is unique
in some special cases, for example, if φ is some exponential function. We refer to Seo
(2009) for a characterization of the uniqueness of μ.
3. Axiomatization with second-order acts
We embed the atemporal KMM model reviewed in Section 2 in a discrete-time inﬁnite-
horizon environment. Time is denoted by t = 0 1 2     Let S be a ﬁnite set of states at
each period. The full state space is S∞.L e t C be a complete, separable, and compact
metric space, which is the set of consumption choices in each period.
3.1 Primary domain
To introduce the domain of choices of primary interest, we consider the set of com-
pound lottery acts introduced by Hayashi (2005). A compound lottery act is identiﬁed
asarandomvariablethatmapsastateoftheworldintoajointlotteryoverconsumption
and a compound lottery act for the next period. Hayashi (2005) shows that the set of all
such acts G satisﬁes the homeomorphic relation13
G   ( (C ×G))S 
It is a compact metric space with respect to the product metric. By abuse of notation,
we may refer S to the set of states as well as its cardinality.
Up to homeomorphic transformations, the domain G of compound lottery acts in-
cludes subdomains G∗, F, M,a n dC∞, which are deﬁned as follows.
• Adapted processes of consumption lotteries are
G∗   ( (C)×G∗)S 
• Adapted processes of consumption levels are
F   (C ×F)S 
13Two topological spaces X and Y are called homeomorphic (denoted X   Y) if there is a one-to-one
continuous map f from X onto Y such that f−1 is continuous too. The map f is called a homeomorphism.432 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
• Compound lotteries are
M    (C ×M) 
• Deterministic consumption streams are
C∞   C ×C∞ 
The subdomain G∗ is obtained by randomizing current consumption only, but not
overacts. ThisdomaincorrespondstotheoneadoptedbyEpsteinandSchneider(2003).
The subdomain F is obtained when there is no randomization. It is adopted by Wang
(2003). The subdomain M is obtained by taking constant acts. Epstein and Zin (1989)
deﬁne recursive utility under objective risk over the domain C × M, while Chew and
Epstein (1991) axiomatize this utility over the domain M    (C × M).T h e s p a c e o f
deterministic consumption plans C∞ is obtained by taking constant acts with no ran-
domization.
Relations among these subdomains are expressed as
G ⊃ G∗ ⊃ F
∪∪ ∪
M ⊃  (C∞) ⊃ ( (C))∞ ⊃ C∞ 
For any c ∈ C,weuseδ[c]todenotethedegeneratelotteryoverc. Whennoconfusion
arises, we tend to omit the symbol of degenerate lottery and write down the determinis-
tic component as it is. For example, a deterministic sequence y = (c0 c1 c2    )is used
as it is, instead of being denoted like (c0 δ[(c1 δ[(c2 δ[···])])]).
3.2 Preferences
We consider two preference relations over two domains. Of primary interest are the
decision maker’s preferences  st at each history st over pairs of current consumption
and continuation compound lottery acts C ×G. Each pair is called a consumption plan.
To recover the decision maker’s second-order beliefs, we introduce another preference
ordering over second-order acts. Take a set of one-step-ahead probability measures
Pst ⊂  (S) as a primitive for each history st. A second-order act on Pst is a mapping
f:Pst → M.L e t (Pst) denote the set of all the second-order acts on Pst.L e t 2
st denote
the conditional second-order preference deﬁned over  (Pst) at each history st.
3.3 Axioms
We start by introducing ﬁve standard axioms for the preference process { st}.F i r s t ,w e
assume weak order (complete and transitive), continuity, and sensitivity. This ensures
theexistenceofacontinuousfunctionalrepresentationofpreference(seeDebreu1954).
Axiom A1 (Order). For all t and st,  st is a continuous weak order over C × G and there
exist y y  ∈ C∞ such that y  st y .Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 433
Second, weassumethatpreferenceoveractsforthefutureisindependentofcurrent
consumption. This axiom is adapted from Koopmans (1960) and is essential for the
representation to have a form in which current consumption and continuation value
are separable.
Axiom A2 (Current Consumption Separability). For all t and st, for all c c  ∈ C and
g g  ∈ G,
(c g)  st (c g ) ⇐⇒ (c  g) st (c  g ) 
Third, we assume that preference over risky consumption is independent of history.
This axiom ensures that utility is stationary (or time invariant) in the pure risk domain
C × M. It also implies that preference over deterministic consumption streams is inde-
pendent of history.
Axiom A3 (History Independence of Risk Preference). For all t, ˜ t and st, ˜ s
˜ t, for all
(c m) (c  m ) ∈ C ×M,
(c m)  st (c  m ) ⇐⇒ (c m)  ˜ s˜ t (c  m ) 
F o u r t h ,w ei m p o s ea ni n d e p e n d e n c ea x i o màl av o nN e u m a n na n dM o r g e n s t e r n
(vNM) for timeless gambles. This axiom is essential to have an expected utility repre-
sentation in the pure risk domain.
Axiom A4 (Independence for Timeless Lotteries). For all t and st, for all m m  n∈ M
and λ ∈ (0 1),
(c m)  st (c m ) ⇐⇒ (c λm+(1−λ)n)  st (c λm  +(1−λ)n) 
Fifth, we impose dynamic consistency to connect conditional preferences across
histories. It is essential to deliver a recursive form of utility representation. The idea
is that if two plans give the same consumption today, but may differ in the continua-
tion choices, then the plan that is preferred tomorrow is also preferred today. Because
of our large choice domain, we need to deﬁne the notion of stochastic dominance so as
to formulate our dynamic consistency condition.
Definition 1. Givenp q ∈  (C ×G), say that p stochastically dominates q with regard
to  st if
p
 




{(c  g ) ∈ C ×G: (c  g )  st (c g)}
 
for all (c g) ∈ C × G. If, in addition, there is some (c g) ∈ C × G such that ≥ is replaced
with >,t h e nw es a yp strictly stochastically dominates q.
When p q ∈  (C × G) stochastically dominate each other, we say that p and q are
stochastically equivalent with regard to  st. Note that in the above deﬁnition, we allow
p or q to be a measure on C × M,s a yp ∈  (C × M).I nt h i sc a s e ,w ev i e wp ∈  (C × G)
with the support C ×M.434 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Axiom A5 (Dynamic Consistency). For all t and st, for all c ∈ C and g g  ∈ G,i f
g(s) (strictly) stochastically dominates g (s) with regard to  st s for each s ∈ S,t h e n
(c g)  st ( st)( c  g  ).
Because we allow lotteries as outcomes of acts whereas preference at each period is
deﬁned over pairs of current consumption and continuation acts, our preceding formu-
lation of dynamic consistency is more general than that in the literature (e.g., Epstein
and Zin 1989, Epstein and Schneider 2003, Hayashi 2005,a n dK M M2009a). When we
restrict attention to smaller domains used in the literature, we obtain the standard deﬁ-
nition. For example, suppose the choice domain is the adapted consumption processes
C × F and the utility representation is given by (2). Our Axiom A5 implies the follow-
ing: For all c ∈ C and d d  ∈ F   (C × F)S,i fd(s)  st ( st)d (s) for each s ∈ S,t h e n
(c d)  st ( st)( c  d  ).
Now,weintroducetwoaxiomson{ 2
st}soastoembedtheatemporalKMMmodelin
the dynamic setting. First, we follow KMM (2009a) and assume that the preference over
second-order acts falls in the subjective expected utility (SEU) theory of Savage (1954),
in which Pst is the state space and M is the set of pure outcomes.
Axiom A6 (SEU Representation of Preference Over Second-Order Acts). For each st,
there exists a unique countably additive probability measure μst :Pst →[ 0 1] and a con-













ing one-step-ahead acts and their corresponding second-order acts. A one-step-ahead
actg+1 ∈ G isacompoundlotteryactinwhichsubjectiveuncertaintyresolvesinjustone
period. Deﬁne the set of one-step-ahead acts as
G+1 ={ g+1 ∈ G: g+1(s) ∈ M ∀s ∈ S} 
Definition 2. Given a one-step-ahead act g+1 ∈ G+1, its corresponding second-order
act on Pst is given by g2






for each π ∈ Pst.
14Because ψ is independent of history st in this axiom, we implicitly assume that  2
st restricted to con-
stant acts in  (Pst) is independent of st.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 435
The axiom below states that the preference { st} over the subdomain of one-step-
ahead acts and the preference { 2
st} over the subdomain of the corresponding second-
order acts are consistent with each other.
Axiom A7 (Consistency With Preference Over Second-Order Acts). For each st, for every
c ∈ C and g+1 h+1 ∈ G+1,





Now we state our ﬁrst representation theorem.
Theorem 1 (Representation). The preference process { st  2
st} satisﬁes Axioms A1–A7 if
and only if there exists representation ({Vst} W u v {μst}) such that the following condi-
tions are valid.
(i) On C ×G, each  st is represented by

















for each (c g) ∈ C × G,w h e r eW :C × R → R is continuous and strictly increasing
in the second argument, and u v:R → R are continuous and strictly increasing
functions.15
(ii) On C ×M, each Vst coincides with





u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )
  
∀(c m) ∈ C ×M  (9)
(iii) On  (Pst), each  2





v ◦u−1 ◦ ¯ u(g(π))dμst(π) ∀g ∈  (Pst) 




u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m ) ∀m ∈ M  (10)
In addition, we have the following uniqueness result, up to some monotonic trans-
formations.
15Note that the domains of W , u, and v may be smaller than those speciﬁed in the theorem. We do not
make this explicit so as to avoid introducing additional notations.436 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). Let { st  2
st} satisfy Axioms A1–A7.I f b o t h ({ ˜ Vst}  ˜ W ˜ u  ˜ v 
{˜ μst}) and ({Vst} W u v {μst}) represent { st  2
st}, then there exist a strictly increasing
function   and constants A>0 and B such that for all st, ˜ μst = μst and
˜ Vst =  ◦Vst  ˜ W( · ·) =  (W (·  −1(·)))
˜ u◦  = Au+B  ˜ v ◦  = v 
Our representation in the theorem nests several models as special cases.
1. When there is no randomization (i.e., g(s) is a degenerate lottery for all s ∈ S), the
representation reduces to (2)o nC × F. As discussed in Section 1, many popular
utility models are special cases of (2).
2. Inthepureriskcase,(9)istherecursiveexpectedutilitymodelofKrepsandPorteus
(1978)a n dEpstein and Zin (1989).
3. In the deterministic case, the representation reduces to the Koopmans form
V( c y)= W (c V (y))  (11)
where (c y) ∈ C ×C∞.
Our preference model incorporates an information structure with hidden states. As
an example, suppose z is a parameter taking values in a ﬁnite set Z.L e t
Pst ={ πz(·|st) ∈  (S): z ∈ Z}  (12)
where πz(·|st) is a conditional distribution on S given history st and the parameter
value z. Thedistribution πz(·|st) maybederivedbytheBayesrulefromamoreprimitive
family of distributions {πz}z∈Z on S∞.E a c hπz represents a statistical model. Then the
representation in (8) reduces to (3)w h e ng(s) is a degenerate lottery for all s ∈ S.
Theorem 1 does not say anything about how measures μst at all histories st are re-
lated. In application, it is natural that μst is obtained by Bayesian updating from the
initial prior μ = μs0. To deliver this result, we consider (2) in the special case with (12).
We follow KMM (2009a) and assume a full rank condition. Extending KMM’s (2009a)
Assumption 10, we introduce a marginal rate of substitution assumption for smooth











where πz(st+n|st) is theconditional probability of st+n given st, ¯ c is a constant consump-
tion plan, and c(st+n) and c(st) are consumption levels at histories st+n and st,r e s p e c -
tively. In addition, β(¯ c) = W2(¯ c  ¯ V)is the discount factor, where ¯ V = W(¯ c  ¯ V) .A s i n
KMM (2009a), we can show that if the full rank condition holds, then the marginal rate
of substitution assumption is equivalent to Bayesian updating of μst.
Theorem 1 does not say anything about the existence and uniqueness of a solution
for {Vst} to the recursive equation (8). Following a similar argument to that in the proofTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 437
of Theorem 2 in KMM (2009a), we can show that {Vst} exists. We need additional condi-
tions for the uniqueness. Epstein and Zin (1989) provide sufﬁcient conditions for recur-
sive expected utility. KMM (2009a) give sufﬁcient conditions for their recursive smooth
ambiguity model. Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) derive sufﬁcient conditions for
general recursive equations that may be applied to our model.
3.5 Ambiguity attitude
Because our model nests the deterministic case (11) and the pure risk case (9), we im-
mediately deduce that the function W characterizes intertemporal substitution and the
function u characterizes risk aversion in the usual way. We turn to the characterization
of ambiguity aversion. We adopt the behavioral foundation of ambiguity attitude de-
veloped by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)a n dK M M( 2005). Epstein (1999)p r o v i d e sa
differentfoundation. Themaindifferenceisthatthebenchmarkambiguityneutralpref-
erence is the expected utility preference according to Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002),
while Epstein’s (1999) benchmark is the probabilistic sophisticated preference.
We ﬁrst consider absolute ambiguity aversion. According to our ﬁrst axiomatiza-
tion, ambiguity comes from the multiplicity of distributions in the set Pst. The decision
maker’s ambiguity attitude is toward uncertainty about the possible distributions in Pst.
To characterize this attitude, we deﬁne the lottery m(g+1 μst) ∈ M associated with the









s∈S g+1(s)π(s) is the outcome of the second-order act g2
+1(π) associated with
g+1, m(g+1 μst) is simply the mean value of g2
+1 with respect to the second-order belief
μst. Alternatively, from the deﬁnition of predictive distribution in (4), we observe that
the lottery m(g+1 μst) is also the mean value of the act g+1 with respect to the predictive
distribution induced by μst. The following deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion states that
the decision maker is ambiguity averse if he prefers a sure lottery obtained as the mean
value of a given act to the act itself.
Definition 3. The decision maker with { st} exhibits ambiguity aversion if for all st,
for all c ∈ C and g+1 ∈ G+1,
(c m(g+1 μst))  st (c g+1) 
Similarly to this deﬁnition, we can deﬁne ambiguity loving and ambiguity neutrality
in the usual way. An immediate consequence of this deﬁnition is the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1. Suppose { st} satisﬁes Axioms A1–A7.T h e n { st} exhibits ambiguity
aversion if φ ≡ v ◦u−1 is concave.16
16If v◦u−1 is concave, it is easy to check that { st} satisﬁes the uncertainty aversion axiom of Gilboa and
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The proof of this proposition is straightforward and is omitted. Clearly, when v◦u−1
is linear, { st} displays ambiguity neutrality. Thus, the ambiguity neutrality benchmark
is the recursive expected utility model. We need additional conditions to establish the
converse statement that ambiguity aversion implies concavity of v ◦ u−1.T h er e a s o ni s
that, to prove this statement, one needs to know preferences over binary bets on some
Pst, but our axioms and representation hold only for ﬁxed Pst. To deal with this issue in
the KMM model, KMM (2005) consider a family of preference relations indexed by rich
supports of second-order beliefs, and impose an assumption that ambiguity attitude
and risk attitude are invariant across these supports (see their Assumption 4). We can
adapt their assumption to establish the converse statement. Since the proof is similar to
the proof of Proposition 1 in their paper, we omit it here.
We now turn to comparative ambiguity aversion.
Definition 4. Let the representations of the preferences of persons i and j share the
same second-order belief μst on the same support Pst for all st. Say that { i
st} is more
ambiguity averse than { 
j
st} if for all st,f o ra l lc ∈ C, m ∈ M,a n dg+1 ∈ G+1,
(c m)  
j
st (c g+1)  ⇒ (c m)  i
st (c g+1) 
and if this property also holds for strict preference relations  i
st and  
j
st.
The interpretation of this deﬁnition is similar to that of Deﬁnition 5 in KMM (2005).
Theideaisthatifperson i prefersalotteryoveranuncertainactwheneverperson j does
so, then this must be due to person i’s comparatively higher aversion to uncertainty.
This cannot be due to aversion to risk, because the act g+1 itself may be a lottery and
the conditions in the deﬁnition imply that persons i and j rank lotteries in the same
way. Because the difference in beliefs is ruled out in the deﬁnition, the behavior in the
deﬁnition must be due to differences in ambiguity attitude. The following proposition
is a partial characterization. We omit its straightforward proof.
Proposition 2. Suppose { i
st} and { 
j
st} satisfy Axioms A1–A7 and their representations
share the same second-order belief μst o nt h es a m es u p p o r tPst for all st.T h e n { i
st} is
more ambiguity averse than { 
j
st} if there exist corresponding utility representations such
that V i|C×M = V j|C×M, W i = W j, ui = uj,a n dvi =  ◦vj,w h e r e  is a strictly increasing
and concave function.
As in the case of absolute ambiguity aversion, one needs more information to es-
tablish the converse statement that comparative ambiguity aversion implies concavity
of  . Asdiscussedearlier,wemaymakeanassumptionsimilartoAssumption4inKMM
(2005) to establish this statement.
4. Axiomatization with two-stage compound lottery acts
To embed Seo’s (2009) atemporal model in a dynamic setting, we adapt his atemporal
domain—the set of lotteries over Anscombe–Aumann acts—to a dynamic setting. This
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4.1 Domain
We consider preference relations  st at each history st deﬁned on the domain C × (H),
where H is a set of two-stage compound lottery acts constructed as follows. Inductively
deﬁne the family of sets {H0 H1    } by
H0 = ( (C))S
H1 =
 
 (C × (H0))
 S
     
Ht =
 
 (C × (Ht−1))
 S
and so on. By induction,  (C ×  (Ht−1)) and Ht are compact metric spaces, for every
t ≥ 1.L e tH∗ =
 ∞
t=0Ht.I ti sac o m p a c tm e t r i cs p a c ew i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ep r o d u c tm e t r i c .
We consider sequences of acts (h0 h1 h2    )in H∗ that are coherent.T h a ti s ,ht and
ht+1 must be consistent for all t ≥ 0 in the sense that is made precise in Appendix B.
The domain of coherent acts, a subset of H∗, is denoted by H. The details of the deﬁ-
nition of coherent acts and formal construction of the domain are given in Appendix B.
The domain H satisﬁes a homeomorphic property analogous to those shown in Epstein
and Zin (1989), Chew and Epstein (1991), Wang (2003), Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), and
Hayashi (2005).
Theorem 3. The set H is homeomorphic to ( (C × (H)))S, denoted as
H  
 
 (C × (H))
 S
 
When attentionis restricted toconstant acts, weobtain thesubdomain consisting of
two-stage compound lotteries, which satisﬁes the homeomorphism
L    (C × (L)) 
Relations among the domains deﬁned so far are summarized as
H ⊃ G ⊃ G∗ ⊃ F
∪∪ ∪ ∪
L ⊃ M ⊃  (C∞) ⊃ ( (C))∞ ⊃ C∞ 
In particular, the set of compound lottery acts G and the set of compound lotteries M
studied in Section 3 are subsets of H and L, respectively.
We now introduce some useful notations. For any two-stage compound lottery acts,
h h  ∈ H,a n da n yλ ∈ (0 1),w eu s eλh + (1 − λ)h  ∈  (H) to denote a lottery that gives
h with probability λ and h  with probability 1 − λ.W eu s eλh ⊕ (1 − λ)h  ∈ H to denote
a statewise mixture. That is, for each s ∈ S and each Borel set B ∈ B(C ×  (H)), λh ⊕
(1 − λ)h (s)(B) = λh(s)(B) + (1 − λ)h (s)(B).F o ra n yp q ∈  (H), λp + (1 − λ)q ∈  (H)
denotes the usual mixture.440 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
4.2 Axioms
We impose the following axioms on the preference process { st}. The ﬁrst three axioms
are analogous to Axioms A1–A3.
Axiom B1 (Order). For all t and st,  st is a continuous weak order over C ×  (H) and
there exist y y  ∈ C∞ such that y  st y .
Axiom B2 (Current Consumption Separability). For all t and st, for all c c  ∈ C and
p q ∈  (H),
(c p)  st (c q) ⇐⇒ (c  p) st (c  q) 
Axiom B3 (History Independence of Risk Preference). For all t, ˜ t and st, ˜ s
˜ t, for all
(c a) (c  a ) ∈ C × (L),
(c a)  st (c  a ) ⇐⇒ (c a)  ˜ s˜ t (c  a ) 
Next, we assume independence conditions for “timeless” gambles, similar to Ax-
iom A4. There are two kinds of such timeless gambles here: One is made before the
realization of the one-step-ahead subjective uncertainty, and the other is made after
that.
Axiom B4 (First-stage Independence). For all t and st, for all p q r ∈  (H) and
λ ∈ (0 1),
(c p)  st (c q) ⇐⇒ (c λp+(1−λ)r)  st (c λq +(1−λ)r) 
Axiom B5 (Second-Stage Independence). For all t and st, for all c ∈ C, for all l m n ∈
 (C × (H)) and λ ∈ (0 1),









To connect preferences across histories, we impose a dynamic consistency axiom,
similar to Axiom A5.
Definition 5. Given a b ∈  (C ×  (H)), say that a stochastically dominates b with re-
gard to  st if
a
 




{(c  p ) ∈ C × (H): (c  p )  st (c p)}
 
for all (c p) ∈ C ×  (H). If in addition there is some (c p) ∈ C ×  (H) such that ≥ is re-
placed with >,t h e nw es a ya strictly stochastically dominates b.I fa and b stochastically
dominateeachother,wesaythataand barestochasticallyequivalentwithregardto  st.
Note that in this deﬁnition, we allow a or b to be a measure on C ×  (L),s a y
a ∈  (C × (L)).I nt h i sc a s e ,w ev i e wa ∈  (C × (H)) with the support C × (L).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 441
Axiom B6 (Dynamic Consistency). For all t and st, for all c ∈ C and h h  ∈ H,i f
h(s) (strictly) stochastically dominates h (s) with regard to  st s for each s ∈ S,t h e n
(c δ[h])  st ( st)( c  δ [h ]).
Finally, we embed Seo’s (2009) dominance axiom to the set of one-step-ahead acts.
A one-step-ahead act is an act for which subjective uncertainty resolves in just one pe-
riod. We deﬁne the set of one-step-ahead acts as
H+1 ={ h+1 ∈ H: h+1(s) ∈ L ∀s ∈ S} 





Given p+1 ∈  (H+1) and π ∈  (S),d e ﬁ n ea(p+1 π)∈  (L) by
a(p+1 π)(L) = p+1
 
{h+1 ∈ H+1: l(h+1 π)∈ L}
 
for every Borel subset L ⊂ L.
Wetakeasetofone-step-aheadprobabilitymeasures,Pst,asgivenforeachhistoryst
and impose the following dominance axiom on this set. We allow this set to be different
from  (S) to permit more ﬂexibility in applications as discussed in Section 1.
Axiom B7 (Dominance). For all t and st, for all c ∈ C and p+1 p 
+1 ∈  (H+1),
(c a(p+1 π)) st (c a(p 
+1 π)) ∀π ∈ Pst  ⇒ (c p+1)  st (c p 
+1) 
where Pst ⊂  (S).
To interpret this axiom, imagine that Pst is a set of probability distributions, which
contains the “true” distribution unknown to the decision maker. Given the same cur-
rent consumption c, if the decision maker prefers the continuation two-stage lottery
a(p+1 π)induced by p+1 over another one a(p 
+1 π)induced by p 
+1 for each probabil-
ity distribution π ∈ Pst, then he must also prefer (c p+1) over (c p 
+1).
Compared to the axioms in Section 3, First-Stage Independence (Axiom B4)a n d
Dominance (Axiom B7) are the counterparts of the SEU Representation of Preference
Over Second-Order Acts (Axiom A6) and Consistency With Preference Over Second-
Order Acts (Axiom A7). Thus, we can dispense with second-order acts.
4.3 Representation
The following theorem gives our second representation result.442 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Theorem 4 (Representation). The preference process { st} satisﬁes Axioms B1–B7 if and
only if there exists a family of functions ({Vst} W u v)and a process of probability mea-
sures {μst} over Pst such that for each st, the function Vst :C × (H) → R represents  stand
has the form



















for (c p) ∈ C ×  (H),w h e r eW is continuous and strictly increasing in the second argu-
ment, and u and v are continuous and strictly increasing.
Wealso havethefollowing uniqueness result, up tosomemonotonic afﬁne transfor-
mations.
Theorem 5 (Uniqueness). Let { st} satisfy Axioms B1–B7.I f b o t h({ ˜ Vst}  ˜ W ˜ u  ˜ v {˜ μst})
and ({Vst} W u v {μst}) represent { st}, then there exist a strictly increasing function  
and constants A, B, D, E with A D>0,s u c ht h a t
˜ Vst =  ◦Vst  ˜ W( · ·) =  (W (·  −1(·)))
˜ u◦  = Au+B  ˜ v ◦  = Dv +E 
As in the static model of Seo (2009), the process of second-order beliefs {μst} is not
unique in general. For example, when φ = v ◦ u−1 is linear, {μst} is indeterminate. It
is unique if φ is some exponential function. The existence of a solution for {Vst} to the
recursive equation (13) follows a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 2 in KMM
(2009a). We may apply sufﬁcient conditions in Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010)t o
establish uniqueness. The following list shows how the above model nests the existing
models.
1. On the subdomain C × G, the representation reduces to (8), which further reduces
to (2) on C ×F.
2. On the subdomain C × (L), we obtain a pure risk setting where the two-stage ran-
domization is present. In this case, each Vst coincides with the common represen-
tation













where (c a) ∈ C × (L).
3. On the subdomain C × M, we obtain a pure risk setting where only the second-
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4.4 Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion
As discussed before, the function W describes intertemporal substitution. Now, we dis-
cuss how ambiguity aversion is separated from risk aversion in the two-stage random-
ization approach. We begin by characterizing risk aversion. In doing so, we restrict
attention to the subdomain C ×  (L) without subjective uncertainty. In this case, the
utility representation takes the form in (14). Because there is two-stage randomization,
we have two risk attitudes toward the risk in the two stages (or in the ﬁrst order and the
second order).
For the risk in the second stage, we remove the ﬁrst-stage risk by assuming that the
ﬁrst-stagelotteryisdegenerate. Wethenobtaintherepresentationofrecursiveriskpref-
erence given in (9). We can deﬁne risk aversion in the second stage in a standard way
and show that it is completely characterized by the concavity of u.
Turn to risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage. We deﬁne absolute risk aversion in the ﬁrst
stage as follows.
Definition 7. The decision maker with preference { st} exhibits risk aversion in the
ﬁrst stage if for all st, c ∈ C and l l  ∈ L, λ ∈[ 0 1],
 
c δ[λl ⊕(1−λ)l ]
 
 st (c λδ[l]+(1−λ)δ[l ])  (15)
We can similarly deﬁne risk loving and risk neutrality in the ﬁrst stage. In Deﬁni-
tion7, λδ[l]+(1−λ)δ[l ]∈ (L) representsalotteryintheﬁrststageand δ[λl⊕(1−λ)l ]
represents a degenerate lottery over the mixture λl ⊕ (1 − λ)l  in the second stage. Ac-
cording to this deﬁnition, the decision maker may not be indifferent between these two
lotteries, even though they give the same ﬁnal outcome distribution. In particular, if the
decision maker believes that the degenerate lottery is like a sure outcome and must be
preferred, then he displays risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage.
Note that if we replace  st with ∼st in (15), we obtain a dynamic counterpart of Seo’s
(2009) Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom. Thus, according to our Deﬁnition 7,
violation of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries reﬂects the decision maker’s attitude
toward the risk in the ﬁrst stage. The following proposition characterizes this risk atti-
tude.
Proposition 3. Suppose { st} satisﬁes Axioms B1–B7.T h e n{ st} exhibits risk aversion
in the ﬁrst-stage if and only if v ◦u−1 is concave.
An immediate corollary of this proposition is that, given Axioms B1–B7, the Reduc-
tion of Compound Lotteries axiom is satisﬁed if and only if v ◦ u−1 is a strictly increas-
ing afﬁne function. In this case, the two lotteries l and a in (14) can be reduced to a
compound lottery and hence (14) reduces to a model belonging to the class of recursive
expected utility under objective risk.
Next, we consider comparative risk aversion.444 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Definition 8. Say that { i
st} is more risk averse than { 
j
st} in the ﬁrst stage if for all st,
c ∈ C, l ∈ L,a n da ∈  (L),
(c δ[l])  
j
st (c a)  ⇒ (c δ[l])  i
st (c a) 
and if this property also holds true for strict preference relations  
j
st and  i
st.
Take current consumption c as given. Suppose person j prefers a “sure” outcome
(with the outcome being a lottery) to an arbitrary lottery for tomorrow. This must be
due to j’s aversion to risk. Facing the same choices, if person i is more risk averse than
person j in the ﬁrst stage, then person i should dislike what person j dislikes.
Proposition 4. Suppose { i
st} and { 
j
st} satisfy Axioms B1–B7.T h e n{ i
st} is more risk
averse than { 
j
st} in the ﬁrst stage if and only if there exist corresponding utility represen-
tations such that V i|C× (L) = V j|C× (L), W i = W j, ui = uj,a n dvi =   ◦ vj,w h e r e  is a
strictly increasing and concave transformation.
By Deﬁnition 8,p e r s o n si and j rank deterministic consumption plans in the same
way and rank lotteries in the second stage in the same way. Thus, (W i ui) and (W j uj)
are ordinally equivalent. Proposition 4 shows that person i is more risk averse than per-
son j in the ﬁrst stage if and only if vi is a monotone concave transformation of vj.
Now, we consider ambiguity attitude. Because ambiguity attitude deals with subjec-
tive uncertainty, we focus on the subdomain C ×  (H+1) in which uncertainty resolves
in just one period. We deﬁne absolute ambiguity aversion as follows.
Definition 9. The decision maker with { st} exhibits ambiguity aversion if for all st,
c ∈ C, h+1 h 
+1 ∈ H+1,a n dλ ∈[ 0 1],
 
c δ[λh+1 ⊕(1−λ)h 
+1]
 
 st (c λδ[h+1]+(1−λ)δ[h 
+1])  (16)
We can similarly deﬁne ambiguity loving and ambiguity neutrality. Deﬁnition 9 says
thatifaﬁrst-stagemixtureofactsispreferredtotheirsecond-stagemixture,thenthede-
cision maker is ambiguity averse. The intuition for this deﬁnition is that hedging across
ambiguous states is valuable compared to randomization of acts before the realization
of the states. It is related to Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) deﬁnition of ambiguity aver-
sion,whichstatesthathedgingacrossstatesfortwoindifferentactsisvaluabletoanam-
biguity averse decision maker.17 When  st is replaced with ∼st in (16), then it becomes
the dynamic counterpart of Seo’s Reversal of Order axiom. Thus, ambiguity attitude is
associated with the violation of the Reversal of Order axiom.
An example taken from Seo (2009) illustrates Deﬁnition 9. Restrict attention to a
static setting. Consider an Ellsberg urn that contains 100 black or white balls, but the
exactcompositionisunknown. Thestateoftheworldisthecoloroftheball. Let f bethe
17Given Axiom B4 (First-Stage Independence), our deﬁnition implies the following Gilboa and Schmei-
dler deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion: (c δ[h+1]) ∼st (c δ[h 
+1])  ⇒ (c δ[λh+1 ⊕(1−λ)h 
+1])  st (c δ[h+1])
for all st, c ∈ C, h+1 h 
+1 ∈ H+1, and λ ∈[ 0 1].Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 445
act that gives $100 if the chosen ball is black and nothing otherwise. Let g be the act that
gives $100 if the chosen ball is white and nothing otherwise. Let p be a lottery with 50%
chance of winning $100. Experimental evidence reveals that most people are indifferent
between f and g, but prefer p to f and p to g. The ﬁrst-stage mixture 1
2f + 1
2g is still
an ambiguous act. But the second-stage mixture 1
2f ⊕ 1
2g gives an identical lottery p no
matter whether the chosen ball is black or white. Thus, it is intuitive that an ambiguity





As Seo (2009)a n dSegal (1987, 1990) point out, ambiguity attitude is associated with
violation of the Reduction of Compound Lotteries.18 We now characterize this relation-
ship. In his atemporal model, Seo (2009) shows that Reduction of Compound Lotteries
and Reversal of Order are equivalent under Dominance. Adapting his argument to our
dynamic two-stage compound lottery acts framework, we show below that ambiguity
aversion is identical to risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage.
Proposition 5. Suppose { st} satisﬁes Axioms B1–B7.T h e n { st} exhibits ambiguity
aversion if and only if { st} exhibits risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage.
An immediate implication of this proposition is that ambiguity aversion is equiva-
lent to concavity of v ◦ u−1. In addition, the decision maker is ambiguity neutral if and
only if v ◦ u−1 is a strictly increasing afﬁne function. As a result, the four distributions
h, π, μst,a n dp can be reduced to a compound distribution and the model reduces to
recursive expected utility under uncertainty.





order belief μst on the same support Pst. Say that { i
st} is more ambiguity averse than
{ 
j
st} if for all st,a l lc ∈ C, l ∈ L,a n dh+1 ∈ H+1,
(c δ[l])  
j
st (c δ[h+1])  ⇒ (c δ[l])  i
st (c δ[h+1]) 
and if this property also holds true for strict preference relations  
j
st and  i
st.
To interpret this deﬁnition, ﬁx current consumption at c and consider two sure out-
comes for tomorrow, with one outcome being a lottery and the other outcome being
a one-step-ahead act. Suppose person j prefers the sure lottery outcome to the sure
one-step-ahead act. This must be due to person j’s aversion to subjective uncertainty
or ambiguity. Facing the same choices, if person i dislikes what person j dislikes, then
person i must be more ambiguity averse than person j because differences in beliefs are
ruled out.
The following proposition states that in the framework of two-stage randomization,
comparative ambiguity aversion is identical to comparative risk aversion in the ﬁrst
stage.
18Halevy (2007) ﬁnds experimental evidence to support this view. This view is controversial because
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Proposition 6. Suppose that { i
st} and { 
j
st} satisfy Axioms B1–B7 and that their repre-
sentations share the same second-order belief μst o nt h es a m es u p p o r tPst for all st.T h e n
{ i
st} is more ambiguity averse than { 
j
st} if and only if { i
st} is more risk averse than { 
j
st}
in the ﬁrst stage.
Given Axioms B1–B7, an immediate corollary of this proposition is that a decision
maker’s preferences have a representation with a concave function v ◦ u−1 if and only if
heismoreambiguityaversethanadecisionwhosepreferencesarerepresentedbyrecur-
sive expected utility. This result connects our deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion in Deﬁni-
tion 5 to our deﬁnition of comparative ambiguity aversion in Deﬁnition 6.I ts h o w st h a t
recursive expected utility is the dividing line between ambiguity loving and ambiguity
aversion.
What is the relationship between the notion of ambiguity aversion deﬁned in this
section and that in Section 3? Because the preference domain of choices is different
under the two approaches in these two sections, ambiguity aversion reﬂects different
natures. But the utility representations under these two approaches give identical func-
tionals in the domain of adapted consumption processes. In addition, these two ap-
proachesgiveidenticalcharacterizationsofambiguityattitudeintermsofthefunctionv
for ﬁxed u or v ◦u−1.
Unlike the second-order act approach in Section 3 or KMM (2005), the two-stage
randomization approach does not need to have a rich support of μst to establish that
absoluteorcomparativeambiguityaversionimpliesconcavityorcomparativeconcavity
of v ◦ u−1. The reason is that the presence of two-stage randomization provides rich
choices of lotteries, which allow us to use the standard analysis for objective risk.
5. Application
We use the representation in (3) to illustrate the application of our general model in
ﬁnance. In that model, the decision maker does not observe a ﬁnite parameter z ∈ Z
and has ambiguous beliefs about the possible consumption distributions πz indexed
by z (Pst in (2)i sas e ti n d e x e db yz). We ﬁrst derive the utility gradient (Dufﬁe and
Skiadas 1994) for the utility function deﬁned in (3). The utility gradient is useful for
solving an individual’s optimal consumption and investment problem. It is also useful
for equilibrium asset pricing. We deﬁne the gradient of a utility function V0 at c given z
as the adapted process (ξz












Let Vt denote Vst(c) in (3)a n dd e ﬁ n e




w h e r ew eu s eμt and πz t to denote the posterior distribution μst and the conditional
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Proposition 7. Suppose W , u,a n dv are differentiable. Then the utility gradient (ξz
t )
at c for the generalized smooth ambiguity model is given by ξz
t = λtEz
t for all t,w h e r e







v  ◦u−1(Eπz s[u(Vs+1)])
u (u−1(Eπz s[u(Vs+1)]))
u (Vs+1)  Ez
0 = 1  (19)
This proposition demonstrates that under some regularity conditions, our gener-
alized recursive smooth ambiguity model delivers a unique utility gradient, which is
tractable for applications. By contrast, the widely adopted recursive multiple-priors
model implies a set of utility supergradients due to its kinked indifference curves (see
Epstein and Wang 1994). After we obtain the utility gradient, we can easily derive
the pricing kernel. The pricing kernel Mz




t . The pricing kernel is often referred to in the literature as the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution or the stochastic discount factor.
In applications, it proves important to work with tractable parametric utility func-
tionals. Our model permits ﬂexible parametric speciﬁcations. Inspired by Epstein and
Zin (1989), we consider the following homothetic functional forms in (3):
W( c y)=[ (1−β)c1−ρ +βy1−ρ]
1








 η > 0  = 1  (22)
where β ∈ (0 1) is the subjective discount factor, 1/ρ represents the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution (EIS), γ is the risk aversion parameter, and η is the ambiguity
aversion parameter. If η = γ, the decision maker is ambiguity neutral and our model
reduces to the recursive utility model of Epstein and Zin (1989)a n dWeil (1989). The
decision maker displays ambiguity aversion if and only if η>γ. By the property of cer-
tainty equivalent, a more ambiguity averse agent with a higher value of η has a lower
utility level. The preceding interpretations are justiﬁed by our axiomatic foundations in
previoussections. WereferthereadertoJu and Miao (forthcoming)formorediscussions
on the speciﬁcation in (20)–(22).
The key to understanding asset pricing puzzles in a representative–agent consump-
tion-based framework is to understand the pricing kernel. We now derive the pricing
kernel for the homothetic generalized recursive ambiguity model. As is well known in
the literature of recursive utility, we can write the pricing kernel in two ways.
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where Rt+1 is the market return from periods t to t +1 that satisﬁes
Xt+1 = Rt+1(Xt −ct)  (25)
where (Xt) is the wealth process.
When η = γ, thehomotheticrecursiveambiguitymodelreducestotheEpstein–Zin–
Weil model. In this case, the pricing kernel in (23)o r( 24) reduces to that in Epstein and
Zin (1989)a n dHansen et al. (2008). Why is our generalized recursive smooth ambiguity
modelusefulinexplainingassetpricingpuzzles? Equation(23)revealsthattherearetwo
adjustments to the standard pricing kernel β(ct+1/ct)−ρ. The ﬁrst adjustment is present
for recursive expected utility of Epstein and Zin (1989). This adjustment is the second
termontheright-handsideof(23). Thesecondadjustmentisduetoambiguityaversion,
which is given by the last term on the right-hand side of (23). This adjustment has the
feature that an ambiguity averse agent with η>γputs a higher weight on the pricing
kernel when his continuation value is low in recessions. This pessimistic behavior helps
explain the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle, and also generates the
time-varying equity premium.
Ju and Miao (forthcoming)studythequantitativeimplicationsoftheabovehomoth-
eticspeciﬁcationusingthepricingkernelin(23),whenz isgovernedbyaregimeswitch-
ing process. They show that our model proves successful in explaining many asset pric-
ing puzzles quantitatively.
6. Related literature
Our paper is related to a small literature on axiomatically founded dynamic models of
ambiguity. Our second-order act approach is closely related to KMM (2009a).19 Un-
like that paper, we adopt a hierarchical Anscombe–Aumann-type domain. This domain
allows us to impose simple and intuitive axioms. More importantly, it permits a separa-
tion of intertemporal substitution from attitudes toward risk or uncertainty. Our utility
representation allows for ﬂexible parametric speciﬁcations, and nests the KMM (2009a)
model and some other popular models in the literature as special cases such as the re-
cursive expected utility model (Kreps and Porteus 1978 and Epstein and Zin 1989)a n d
the multiplier preference model with hidden states (Hansen 2007 and Hansen and Sar-
gent 2007a). In addition, this representation permits an information structure with hid-
den states that could be unknown parameters as in KMM (2009a) or Markov processes.
19Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) also provide a dynamic extension of the KMM (2005)m o d e l .T h e i ra p -
proach is nonrecursive in that they ﬁrst deﬁne preference over consumption plans and then determine
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Our preference domain in the second-order act approach is built on Hayashi (2005),
who ﬁrst constructs the domain of compound lottery acts G. He chooses  (C × G) as
the preference domain, while we adopt C ×G as the primary domain of preference { st}.
Our domain choice proves to be more convenient in our setting. Hayashi (2005)e m -
beds Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) static multiple-priors model in a dynamic environ-
ment and establishes a generalized recursive multiple-priors model. His model permits
a separation of intertemporal substitution from attitudes toward risk or uncertainty. It
generalizes the recursive multiple-priors model of Epstein and Wang (1994)a n dEpstein
and Schneider (2003). Epstein and Schneider (2003) axiomatize the recursive multiple-
priors model and prove that dynamic consistency leads to rectangular sets of priors and
to prior-by-prior Bayesian updating as the updating rule for such sets of priors. Wang
(2003) also axiomatizes this model and some updating rules for preferences that are not
necessarily in the expected utility class. Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) follow a nonrecur-
sive approach and extend the Epstein and Schneider model by allowing updating of the
set of priors to violate conseqentialism. As KMM (2005) point out, one limitation of the
multiple-priors model is that there is no separation between ambiguity and ambiguity
attitude. The set of priors may reﬂect the decision maker’s perceived ambiguity or his
attitude toward ambiguity. This confounding makes comparative static analysis hard to
interpret.
Our second axiomatization using the two-stage randomization approach extends
Seo’s (2009) static model to a dynamic setting. To the best of our knowledge, our paper
provides the ﬁrst dynamic extension of Seo’s static model. As a by-product contribution,
we construct a domain of two-stage compound lottery acts H, which contains G and
allows for randomization both before and after the realization of the state of the world.
Wethendispensewithsecond-orderactsandtheassociatedpreferencesovertheseacts.
We deﬁne a single preference relation { st} over C × (H).
Our characterizationof ambiguity attitudein thetwo axiomatic approachesis based
on the foundation of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). Ambiguity aversion reﬂects
somewhat different natures in the two approaches because of different choice domains,
though the characterization in terms of concavity of v ◦ u−1 is identical. In the second-
order act approach, ambiguity aversion is an aversion to the subjective uncertainty
about ex ante evaluations of one-step-ahead acts. In the two-stage randomization ap-
proach, ambiguity aversion is associated with the violation of reduction of compound
lotteries, as also pointed out by Segal (1987, 1990)a n dSeo (2009). Segal uses the antici-
pated utility model and considers objective lotteries, while the Ellsberg paradox is often
viewed as a phenomenon associated with subjective uncertainty. Seo does not provide
a formal deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion and characterizations of ambiguity attitude.
We provide such an analysis and characterize the link between ambiguity aversion and
reduction of compound lotteries. Our result that ambiguity aversion is identical to risk
aversion in the ﬁrst stage is similar to Theorem 5 in Ergin and Gul (2009), who refer to
risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage as second-order risk aversion.
Maccheroni et al. (2006b) provide a dynamic extension of the static variational
modelofambiguitydevelopedbyMaccheronietal.(2006a). Thestaticvariationalmodel
includes the multiple-priors model and the multiplier preference model of Hansen and450 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Sargent (2001) as special cases. The dynamic extension does not separate intertemporal
substitutionfromattitudetowardriskorambiguity. Variationalpreferencesarealsosub-
ject to the limitation concerning the separation of ambiguity from ambiguity attitude.
Our model is also related to the literature on recursive utility under risk or uncer-
tainty (Kreps and Porteus 1978, Epstein and Zin 1989, Chew and Epstein 1991, Skiadas
1998,a n dKlibanoff and Ozdenoren 2007). This literature does not deal with ambiguity.
In the framework of Klibanoff and Ozdenoren (2007)o rSkiadas (1998), preferences de-
pend on the ﬁltration. Unlike their framework, we take the ﬁltration as given and, thus,
cannot make comparisons of representations across ﬁltrations.
Recursive utility models allow for preferences for the timing of the temporal resolu-
tion of uncertainty. As is well known in the literature on recursive expected utility pref-
erences, a nonlinear time aggregator is needed to permit nonindifference to the timing
of the temporal resolution of uncertainty. Strzalecki (2009) shows that even without a
nonlinear aggregator, or with standard discounting, most dynamic models of ambigu-
ity aversion (including the models discussed above) result in timing nonindifference.
In particular, decision makers with such preferences prefer earlier resolution of uncer-
tainty. The only model of ambiguity aversion that exhibits indifference to timing is the
multiple-priors utility model. Our paper does not study this issue. Presumably, Strza-
lecki’s analysis can be applied to our setting.
Finally, like most papers in the literature on dynamic models, we follow a recursive
approach and maintain dynamic consistency. This approach is normatively appealing
and computationally simple in applications because the usual dynamic programming
method can be applied. This approach typically shares the drawback of lacking a “re-
duction” or “closure” property as discussed in KMM (2009a).20 This means that our re-
cursivemodel(2)overadaptedconsumption processesdoesnothavethereducedstatic
KMMsmoothambiguityfunctionalform. Siniscalchi(2011)followsadifferentapproach
to formulating dynamic models of ambiguity. He takes an individual’s preferences over
decision trees, rather than acts, as primitive. His approach allows for dynamic inconsis-
tency. He formalizes sophistication as an assumption about the way individuals resolve
conﬂicts between preferences at different decision points. It remains to see whether
dynamic smooth ambiguity preferences can be formulated in his framework.
Appendix A: Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
We prove the sufﬁciency of the axioms. The proof of necessity is routine.
A1 Representation of risk preference
When { st} is restricted to the domain C × M, Axiom A3 (History Independence of Risk
Preference) implies that { st} induces a single preference relation   deﬁned on C × M.
By Axiom A1 (Order) and Debreu’s (1954) theorem, there is a continuous representation
V :C ×M → R of  . We ﬁx such a representation.
20Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Maccheroni et al. (2006b) are exceptions.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 451
Fix some arbitrary  c ∈ C throughout the proof. By Axiom A2 (Current Consumption
Separability), V( c ·) and V(   c ·) represent the same ranking over M;h e n c eV has the
form
V( c m )=   W( c V(   c m)) (26)
for some function   W that is strictly increasing in the second argument. By Axiom A4
(Independence for Timeless Lotteries), V(   c m) is ordinally equivalent to an expected
utility representation on C ×M. Thus, we have the form
V(   c m)= ζ
  
C×M
  u(c  m )dm(c  m )
 
  (27)
where  u is a vNM index and ζ is a monotone transformation.
Lemma 1. Given Axioms A1 and A3, Axiom A5 implies that
(c δ[(c  m )])   (c δ[(c   m  )]) ⇐⇒ (c  m )   (c   m  )
for any c ∈ C and m m  ∈ M.
Proof. We restrict attention to the subdomain C × M.B yAxiom A3 (History Indepen-
dence of Risk Preference), we can replace { st} with   in Axiom A5 (Dynamic Consis-
tency). Suppose (c  m )   (c   m  ).T h e n (c   m  )   (c0 m0)  ⇒ (c  m )   (c0 m0) for
any (c0 m0) ∈ C × M.T h u s , δ[(c  m )] stochastically dominates δ[(c   m  )].B y Ax-
iom A5, (c δ[(c  m )])   (c δ[(c   m  )]). Suppose (c δ[(c  m )])   (c δ[(c   m  )]),b u t
(c  m ) ≺ (c   m  ). By continuity of   from Axiom A1,t h e r ee x i s t ss o m e(c0 m0) ∈ C ×M
such that (c  m ) ≺ (c0 m0)   (c   m  ).T h u s , δ[(c   m  )] strictly stochastically domi-
nates δ[(c  m )].B y Axiom A5, (c δ[(c  m )]) ≺ (c δ[(c   m  )]), which is a contradic-
tion. 
Now, we deduce
  u(c  m ) ≥  u(c   m  ) ⇐⇒ (  c δ[(c  m )])   (  c δ[(c   m  )]) (by (27))
⇐⇒ (c  m )   (c   m  ) (by Lemma 1)
⇐⇒ V( c   m ) ≥ V( c    m  ) 
Hence,   u and V are ordinally equivalent representations of   on C × M, implying that
there is a monotone transformation u such that   u = u ◦ V . Plugging this equation
into (27) yields
V(   c m)= ζ
  
C×M
u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )
 
  (28)
Deﬁne W by W( c x )=   W (c ζ(u(x))), which is strictly increasing in the second argu-
ment. Then





u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )
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u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )
  
 
A2 Extension to the whole domain
By an argument similar to the proof of Lemmas 8 and 9 in Hayashi (2005), we can use
continuity of  st from Axiom A1, Dynamic Consistency (Axiom A5), and compactness of
C to show that for each (c g) ∈ C × G,t h e r ee x i s t sarisk equivalent (c m) ∈ C × M such
that (c g) ∼st (c m) for each st. Thus, for each st,d e ﬁ n eVst :C ×G → R by
Vst(c g) = V( c m )   (29)
where m is such that (c g) ∼st (c m). Using this deﬁnition and (26), we obtain
Vst(c g) = V( c m )=   W( c V(   c m))=   W( c V st(  c g))  (30)
From Axioms A6(SEURepresentationofPreferenceOverSecond-OrderActs)andA7
(Consistency With the Preference Over Second-Order Acts), we obtain











where ξst is a monotone transformation. By restricting attention to M,w ec a nu s eAx-
iom A3 (History Independence of Risk Preference) to set ξst = ξ for all st.
Deﬁne v = ψ◦ ¯ u−1 ◦u,w h e r e¯ u is deﬁned in (10).21 Using Axiom A6, we immediately
obtain part (iii) of the theorem. Plugging this deﬁnition of v into (31) yields
Vst(  c g+1) = ξ
  
Pst





















where the second equality follows from (10).
When restricting Vst to the domain M,w eo b t a i n
Vst(  c m)= ξ ◦v ◦u−1
  
C×M
u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )
 
= V(   c m)= ζ
  
C×M
u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )
 
forallm ∈ M,wherethelastequalityfollowsfrom(28). Therefore,wehaveξ◦v◦u−1 = ζ,
implying u−1 ◦ζ−1 ◦ξ = v−1.
21Note that ¯ u is increasing on M when M is ordered by ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance; therefore, its
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Deﬁne














Using (30), we obtain
Vst(c g+1) =   W( c y)=   W
 
c ζ ◦u(u−1 ◦ζ−1(y))
 
= W( c u −1 ◦ζ−1(y))
= W
 































where the third equality follows from the deﬁnition of W in Appendix A1.
For any g ∈ G,f o re a c hs ∈ S and each (c  g ) in the support of g(s) ∈  (C × G),
there exists a risk equivalent (c  m ) ∈ C × M such that (c  m ) ∼st s (c  g ).L e tg+1 be
a one-step-ahead act such that g+1(s)(L ) = g(s)(L) holds for all pairs L ⊂ C × G and
L  ⊂ C × M,w h e r eL  consists of all risk equivalents (c  m ) of corresponding elements
(c  g ) in L. By construction, g+1(s) and g(s) are stochastically equivalent. By Axiom A5
(Dynamic Consistency), (c g) ∼st (c g+1). Therefore,


































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tg(s) and g+1(s) are stochastically equivalent to derive
the second equality.
A3 Proof of uniqueness
Suppose ({ ˜ Vst}  ˜ W ˜ u  ˜ v {˜ μst}) and ({Vst} W u v {μst}) represent the same preference.
On the domain of deterministic consumption streams C∞,e a c h ˜ Vst coincides with the454 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
common function ˜ V and each Vst coincides with the common function V . Since ˜ V and
V are ordinally equivalent over C∞, there is a monotone transformation   such that
˜ V( y)=  ◦V( y) for all y ∈ C∞ 
By (29), we have ˜ Vst =  ◦Vst.
Since
˜ W( c ˜ V( y) )= ˜ V( c y)=  (V (c y))=  (W (c V (y))) =  (W (c  −1( ˜ V (y)))) 
we deduce that ˜ W( c ·) =  (W (c  −1(·))).
On M,
 
C×Mu(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )and
 
C×M ˜ u( ˜ V( c   m ))dm(c  m )areequivalent
mixture-linear representations of the risk preference conditional on the ﬁxed current
consumption  c. Therefore, there exist constants A B with A>0 such that
˜ u( ˜ V( c   m )) = Au(V (c  m ))+B for all (c  m ) ∈ M 
Since ˜ V =  ◦V ,w eo b t a i n˜ u◦  = Au+B.
By construction from Appendix A2, ˜ v◦ ˜ u−1 ◦ ˜ ¯ u = ψ = v◦u−1 ◦ ¯ u.B y( 10), we compute
˜ ¯ u(m) =
 
C×M












u(V (c  m ))dm(c  m )+B = A¯ u(m)+B 
Let ¯ u(m) = w.T h e nw eh a v e
˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1(Aw +B)= v ◦u−1(w) 
Since ˜ u◦ (w)= Au(w)+B, it follows that
˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1(Aw +B)= ˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1(Au◦u−1(w)+B)= ˜ v ◦ (u−1(w)) 
Thus, we obtain
˜ v ◦ (u−1(w)) = v ◦u−1(w) 
By replacing u−1(w) with x,w eo b t a i n˜ v ◦ (x)= v(x)  Finally, uniqueness of μst follows
from Axiom A5.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3
Given a compact metric space Y,l e tB(Y) be the family of Borel subsets of Y and let
 (Y) be the set of Borel probability measures deﬁned over B(Y), which is again a com-
pactmetricspacewith respecttotheweak convergencetopology. InductivelydeﬁnetheTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 455
family of domains {H0 H1    } by
H0 = ( (C))S
H1 =
 
 (C × (H0))
 S
     
Ht =
 
 (C × (Ht−1))
 S 
and so on. By induction,  (C ×  (Ht−1)) is a compact metric space and so is Ht,f o r
every t ≥ 0.L e tdt be the metric over Ht.L e t H∗ =
 ∞
t=0Ht. This is a compact metric





T h ed o m a i nt ob ec o n s t r u c t e di sasubset of H∗, which consists of coherent acts.
D e ﬁ n eam a p p i n gπ0:C × (H0) → C by
π0(c p0) = c
for each (c p0) ∈ C × (H0). Deﬁne a mapping ρ0:H1 → H0 by
ρ0(h1)(s)[B0]=h1(s)[π−1
0 (B0)]
for each h1 ∈ H1, s ∈ S,a n dB0 ∈ B(C). Deﬁne a mapping ˜ ρ0: (H1) →  (H0) by
˜ ρ0(p1)[H0]=p1[ρ−1
0 (H0)]
for each p1 ∈  (H1) and H0 ∈ B(H0).
Similarly, deﬁne π1:C × (H1) → C × (H0) by
π1(c p1) = (c  ˜ ρ0(p1))
for each (c p1) ∈ C × (H1),d e ﬁ n eρ1:H2 → H1 by
ρ1(h2)(s)[B1]=h2(s)[π−1
1 (B1)]
for each h2 ∈ H2, s ∈  ,a n dB1 ∈ B(C × (H0)),a n dd e ﬁ n e ˜ ρ1: (H2) →  (H1) by
˜ ρ1(p2)[H1]=p2[ρ−1
1 (H1)]
for each p2 ∈  (H2) and H1 ∈ B(H1).
Inductively, given πt−1:C ×  (Ht−1) → C ×  (Ht−2), ρt−1:Ht → Ht−1,a n d
˜ ρt−1: (Ht) →  (Ht−1),d e ﬁ n eπt :C × (Ht) → C × (Ht−1) by
πt(c pt) = (c  ˜ ρt−1(pt))
for each (c pt) ∈ C × (Ht),d e ﬁ n eρt :Ht+1 → Ht by
ρt(ht+1)(s)[Bt]=ht+1(s)[π−1
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for each ht+1 ∈ Ht+1, s ∈ S,a n dBt ∈ B(C × (Ht−1)),a n dd e ﬁ n e ˜ ρt : (Ht+1) →  (Ht) by
˜ ρt(pt+1)[Ht]=pt+1[ρ−1
t (Ht)]
for each pt+1 ∈  (Ht+1) and Ht ∈ B(Ht).
Deﬁne
H ={ h = (h0 h1 h2    )∈ H∗: ht = ρt(ht+1) t ≥ 0} 
For each s ∈ S, the sequence (h0(s) h1(s) h2(s)    ) ∈
 ∞
t=0 (C ×  (Ht−1)) is viewed as
a sequence of constant acts since
h0(s) ∈  (C) ⊂ H0
h1(s) ∈  (C × (H0)) ⊂ H1
     
ht(s) ∈  (C × (Ht−1)) ⊂ Ht 
and so on.
The lemmas below verify that such constant acts are also coherent. They are imme-
diate from the deﬁnition of H.
Lemma 2. For every h ∈ H and s ∈ S, the sequence (h0(s) h1(s) h2(s)    ) ∈  ∞
t=0 (C × (Ht−1)) satisﬁes ht(s) = ρt(ht+1(s)).
Lemma 3. For every t ≥ 0, ht ∈ Ht,a n dht+1 ∈ Ht+1,i fht(s) = ρt(ht+1(s)) for every s ∈ S,














 (C × (Ht−1)): at = ρt(at+1) ∀t ≥ 0
 
 
Lemma 4. We have the homeomorphic relation
A    (C ×Q) 
Proof.G i v e n (at) ∈ A ⊂
 ∞
t=0 (C ×  (Ht−1)), by the Kolmogorov extension theorem
there exists a unique a ∈ (C ×
 ∞
t=0 (Ht−1)) such that
mrgC× (Ht−1)a = at
for each t ≥ 0, where mrg denotes marginal. Deﬁne a mapping ξ:A →  (C × Q) by
ξ((at)) = a.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 457
We need to show a ∈  (C ×Q).F o re a c ht ≥ 0,l e t





a(C ×Qt) = mrgC× (Ht)× (Ht+1)a
 

























= at+2(C × (Ht+1)) = 1 
Therefore,
a(C ×Q)= a












• Mapping ξ is one-to-one: This follows from the uniqueness of Kolmogorov exten-
sion theorem.
• Mapping ξ is onto: For every a ∈  (C × Q), the inverse is given by (at) ∈  ∞
t=0 (C × (Ht−1)) such that
at = mrgC× (Ht−1)a

























1 = at(C × (Ht−1)) = at(Bt)+at(Bc
t)
≥ ρt(at+1)(Bt)+ρt(at+1)(Bc
t) = ρt(at+1)(C × (Ht−1)) = 1 458 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
we obtain
at(Bt) = ρt(at+1)(Bt) 
• Mappings ξ and ξ−1 are continuous: This is immediate from the nature of the
product topology. 
Lemma 5. We have the homeomorphic relation
H   AS 
Proof.D e ﬁ n e ξ:H → AS by
ξ(h)(s) = (h0(s) h1(s) h2(s)    ) 
It follows from Lemma 2 that ξ(h) ∈ A.
• Mapping ξ is one-to-one: Suppose ξ(h) = ξ(h ). By deﬁnition of ξ,w eh a v e
(h0(s) h1(s) h2(s)    ) = (h 
0(s) h 
1(s) h 
2(s)    )foralls ∈ S,whichimpliesh = h .
• Mapping ξ is onto:T a k ea n y˜ h ∈ AS. By deﬁnition,
˜ h(s) = (˜ h0(s)  ˜ h1(s)  ˜ h2(s)    ) ∈
∞  
t=0
 (C × (Ht−1))
for each s ∈ S.T h e nξ−1(˜ h) = (h0 h1 h2    )∈ H∗ satisﬁes ht(s) = ˜ ht(s) for each
t and s. By Lemmas 2 and 3, the sequence (h0 h1 h2    )is coherent and hence
ξ−1(˜ h) ∈ H.

















Lemma 6. For any (pt) ∈ P∗, there exists a unique p ∈  (H∗) such that
mrg t
τ=0Hτp = pt 
Moreover, there exists a homeomorphism χ:P∗ →  (H∗).




(h0     ht) ∈
t  
τ=0
Hτ: hτ = ρτ(hτ+1) τ = 0     t−1
 
for each t ≥ 0 and let
P ={ (pt) ∈ P∗: pt(Ht) = 1 t≥ 0} Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 459
Lemma 7. The equality χ(P) =  (H) holds. As a result, P    (H) holds through χ.
Proof.T h e ⊂ part:L e tp = χ((pt)) for some (pt) ∈ P.L e t




for each t ≥ 0.T h e n w e h a v e H ⊂  t ⊂ H∗ for each t ≥ 0, ( t) is decreasing, and
 
t≥0 t = H.
Since p is the Kolmogorov extension of (pt),w eh a v e
p( t) = pt(Ht) = 1
for every t ≥ 0.T h u s ,p(H) = p(
 
t≥0 t) = limp( t) = 1.
The ⊃ part: Pick any p ∈  (H) that satisﬁes p(H) = 1.L e t(pt) be the sequence of
marginals deﬁned by pt = mrg t
τ=0Hτp for each t ≥ 0.T h e npt(Ht) = p( t) ≥ 1,w h e r e
the second inequality follows from  t ⊃ H. Since pt is a probability measure, we have
pt(Ht) = 1. Since p is the Kolmogorov extension of (pt),w eh a v ep = χ((pt)). 
Lemma 8. For every (qt) ∈ Q, there exists a unique (pt) ∈ P such that
mrgHtpt = qt 
Moreover, Q and P are homeomorphic.
Proof. Deﬁne a sequence of mappings (ξt), ξt :Ht →
 t
τ=0Hτ for each t ≥ 0,b y
ξt(ht) = (  h0       ht) 
where  ht = ht and  hτ = ρτ(  hτ+1) for τ = 0 1     t−1.
By construction, each (ξt) is a one-to-one mapping and ξt(Ht) = Ht. Therefore, we
can deﬁne the sequence of inverse mappings (ξ−1
t ), ξ−1
t :Ht → Ht given by
ξ−1
t (h0     ht) = ht 
which is a projection mapping that is continuous.
For (qt) ∈ Q, deﬁne the corresponding sequence (pt) ∈ P by
pt(Et) = qt(ξ−1
t (Et))
for each Et ∈ B(
 t
τ=0Hτ) and t ≥ 0.W e c a n s e e t h a t (pt) ∈ P since pt(Ht) =
qt(ξ−1
t (Ht)) = qt(Ht) = 1. By construction, mrgHtpt = qt for each t ≥ 0. 
Now, Theorem 3 follows from the fact that H   AS, A    (C × Q), Q   P,a n d
P    (H).460 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Finite-step-ahead acts and denseness
Finally, we deﬁne ﬁnite-step-ahead acts and show that the union of all the sets of ﬁnite-





 (C × (H))
 S: ∀s ∈ S h+1(s) ∈  (C × (L))
 
 
Since H   ( (C × (H)))S,w ec a ne m b e dH+1 into H, where the range of H+1 is embed-





 (C × (H))
 S: ∀s ∈ S h+τ(s) ∈  (C × (H+(τ−1)))
 
 
Similarly, we can embed H+τ into H.W ec a l l
 
τ≥1H+τ the domain of ﬁnite-step-ahead
acts.
Lemma 9. The domain of ﬁnite-step-ahead acts
 
τ≥1H+τ is a dense subset of H.A l s o ,  
τ≥1 (C × (H+τ)) is a dense subset of  (C × (H)).
This resultis analogoustoProposition 1 in Hayashi (2005)and its proofis omitted. It
is useful to establish the existence of a risk equivalent as in Lemma 9 of Hayashi (2005).
We implicitly applied a similar result in Appendix A.
Appendix C: Proofs of Theorems 4 and 5
We prove the sufﬁciency of the axioms. The proof of necessity is routine.
C1 Representation of risk preference
When{ st}isrestrictedtothedomainC× (L),AxiomB3(HistoryIndependenceofRisk
Preference)impliesthat{ st}inducesasinglepreferencerelation deﬁnedonC× (L).
By Axiom B1 (Order) and Debreu’s (1954) theorem, there is a continuous representation
V :C × (L) → R of  . We ﬁx such a representation.
By Axiom B2 (Current Consumption Separability), V( c ·) and V(   c ·) represent the
same ranking over  (L),h e n c eV has the form
V( c a )=   W( c V(   c a)) ∀(c a) ∈ C × (L) (32)
for some function   W that is strictly increasing in the second argument. Because of Ax-
iom B4 (First-Stage Independence), V(   c a)has the form






where ζ is a strictly increasing function and U is a vNM index.




  u(c  a )dl(c  a )
 
  (34)Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 461
where φ is a strictly increasing function and  u is a vNM index.
By Axiom B6 (Dynamic Consistency) and a similar argument as in Appendix A1,
  u and V are ordinally equivalent. Hence, we deduce that
  u(c  a ) = u(V (c  a ))  (35)
where u is a strictly increasing function.
Plugging (33), (34), and (35) into (32) yields













Now deﬁne W by
W( c x )=   W( c ζ◦φ◦u(x)) 
which is strictly increasing in the second argument. Then we have
  W( c ζ( z) )= W( c u −1 ◦φ−1(z)) (36)
and hence,













Let v = φ◦u. We obtain representation (14).
C2 Extension to the whole domain
Deﬁne Vst :C × (H) by
Vst(c p) = V( c a ) (37)
for each (c p) ∈ C ×  (H),w h e r ea ∈  (L) is such that (c p) ∼st (c a). The existence
of such a risk equivalent a follows from Lemma 9, Dynamic Consistency (Axiom B6),
compactnessofC,andcontinuityof st (seeLemma9inHayashi2005). Usingdeﬁnition
(37)a n d( 32), we derive
Vst(c p) = V( c a )=   W( c V(   c m))=   W( c V st(  c p))  (38)
When our Axioms B1, B4, B5,a n dB7 are restricted to  (H+1), they satisfy the con-
ditions in Theorem 4.2 in Seo (2009). By this theorem, Vst(  c ·) restricted to  (H+1) is
ordinally equivalent to a second-order subjective expected utility representation, and
h e n c eh a st h ef o r m
















  ust(c  a )dh+1(s)(c  a )
 
dμst(π)  (40)462 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
where ζst and φst are strictly increasing functions and   ust is a vNM index. By Axiom B6
(Dynamic Consistency) and a similar argument in Appendix A1,   ust and V are ordinally
equivalent over C × (L). Thus, there is a monotone transformation ust such that
  ust(c  a ) = ust(V (c  a )) (41)
for every (c  a ) ∈ C × (L).












w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a to nL,
ζ(U(l))= V(   c δ[l]) = Vst(  c δ[l]) = ζst(Ust(l)) 
Hence, we deduce that
Ust = ζ−1














By the additivity of integral formula, we have
ζ−1
st ◦ζ(αx+(1−α)y) = αζ−1
st ◦ζ(x)+(1−α)ζ−1
st ◦ζ(y)
for all x y in the range of U and all α ∈[ 0 1]. Therefore, ζst and ζ are identical up to
positive afﬁne transformations. Thus, without loss of generality, we can take ζst = ζ and
Ust = U for all st.










ust ◦V( c   a )dl(c  a )
 
 
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t
φ◦u◦V( c   a ) = U(δ[c  a ]) = Ust(δ[c  a ]) = φst ◦ust ◦V( c   a ) 










st ◦φ◦u◦V( c   a )dl(c  a )
 
 
By the same reasoning as above, φst and φ are identical up to positive afﬁne transfor-
mations. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can set φst = φ and ust = u for all st.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 463
Now, plugging (39), (40), and (41) into (38), we obtain that, on C × (H+1),





































where the second equality follows from (36).
Finally, we extend the above representation to the whole domain C ×  (H).A r i s k
equivalent always exists as discussed before. By a similar argument as in Appendix A2,
for every st and every h ∈ H, there exists a one-step-ahead act h+1 ∈ H+1 such that h(s)
and h+1(s) are stochastically equivalent. We call h+1 the equivalent one-step-ahead act
of h.B yAxiom B6 (Dynamic Consistency), we deduce
(c δ[h]) ∼st (c δ[h+1])  (42)
Suppose that p ∈  (H) has a ﬁnite support {h1 h2     hm},w i t hp =
 
iαiδ[hi],
αi ∈ (0 1),a n d
 
iαi = 1.F o re a c hhi, i = 1     m,l e thi
+1 ∈ H+1 be its equivalent one-
step-ahead act. Let p+1 ∈  (H+1) be a probability measure with a ﬁnite support such
that the support is {h1
+1 h2
+1     hm
+1}, and for each i = 1     m, p+1({hi
+1}) = p({hi}).
By repeated applications of Axiom B4 (First-Stage Independence) and (42), we obtain
(c p) ∼st (c p+1). This relation is also true for arbitrary c ∈ C because of Axiom B2 (Cur-
rent Consumption Separability). By continuity of  st, the claim extends to arbitrary p.
Hence, we have






































w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a th(s) and h+1(s) are stochastically equivalent to derive the last
equality. Deﬁning v = φ◦u, we obtain the representation as in the theorem.464 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
C3 Proof of uniqueness
Suppose ({ ˜ Vst}  ˜ W ˜ u  ˜ v {˜ μst}) and ({Vst} W u v {μst}) represent the same preference.
Onthedomainofdeterministic consumptionstreams C∞,a l l ˜ Vst coincidewiththecom-
mon function ˜ V and all Vst coincide with the common function V . Since ˜ V and V are
ordinally equivalent over C∞, there is a monotone transformation   such that
˜ V( y)=  ◦V( y)
for all y ∈ C∞.B y( 37), we have ˜ Vst =  ◦Vst.
Since
˜ W( c ˜ V( y) )= ˜ V( c y)=  (V (c y))=  (W (c V (y))) =  (W (c  −1( ˜ V (y)))) 
we have ˜ W( c z)=  (W (c  −1(z))).
On L,
 
C× (L)u(V (c  a ))dl(c  a ) and
 
C× (L) ˜ u( ˜ V( c   a ))dl(c  a ) are equivalent
mixture-linear representations of the second-stage risk preference conditional on the
ﬁxed current consumption   c deﬁned in Appendix C1. Therefore, there exist constants
A, B with A>0 such that
˜ u( ˜ V( c   a )) = Au(V (c  a ))+B




˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1
  
C× (L)









u(V (c  a ))dl(c  a )
 
da(l)
are equivalent mixture-linear representations of the ﬁrst-stage risk preference condi-
tional on the ﬁxed current consumption  c. Hence, there exist constants D, E with D>0
such that
˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1
  
C× (L)





u(V (c  a ))dl(c  a )
 
+E 
From the previous result, we have
 
C× (L)
˜ u( ˜ V( c   a ))dl(c  a ) =
 
C× (L)




u(V (c  a ))dl(c  a )+B 
Let
 
C× (L)u(V (c  a ))dl(c  a ) = x.T h e nw eh a v e
˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1(Ax+B)= Dv ◦u−1(x)+E Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 465
From ˜ u◦ (x)= Au(x)+B, it follows that
˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1(Ax+B)= ˜ v ◦ ˜ u−1(Au◦u−1(x)+B)= ˜ v ◦ (u−1(x)) 
Thus, combining the above two equations, we obtain
˜ v ◦ (u−1(x)) = Dv ◦u−1(x)+E 
So ˜ v ◦  = Dv +E.
Appendix D: Proofs for Section 4.4
Proof of Proposition 3.I f v ◦ u−1 is concave, it is straightforward to check that { st}
is risk averse in the ﬁrst stage. We now prove thereverse direction. Pick any l1 l2 ∈ L and
λ ∈[ 0 1].B yTheorem 3,w eh a v e
V( c λ l 1 +(1−λ)l2) = W
 
c v−1 







u(V (c  a ))dl(c  a )










v ◦u−1(λV ∗(l1)+(1−λ)V ∗(l2))
  
 
Fromthedeﬁnitionofriskaversionintheﬁrststage,wehave(c δ[λl1⊕(1−λ)l2])  st
(c λl1 +(1−λ)l2).T h u s ,
λv ◦u−1(V ∗(l1))+(1−λ)v ◦u−1(V ∗(l2)) ≤ v ◦u−1(λV ∗(l1)+(1−λ)V ∗(l2)) 
Wemayvary l1 and l2 tocoverthewholedomainof v◦u−1. Theaboveinequalityimplies
that v ◦u−1 is concave. 
ProofofProposition4. Suppose { i
st} ismoreriskaversethan { 
j
st} intheﬁrststage.
By deﬁnition they rank deterministic consumption streams in the same way and rank
lotteries in the second stage in the same way. So there exist representations such that
V i = V j, W i = W j,a n dui = uj.
Since vi(V i(·)) and vj(V j(·)) are ordinally equivalent over C∞, there is a monotone
transformation   such that vi =   ◦ vj. It remains to show that   is concave. Let
y y  y   ∈ C∞ be such that (c δ[δ[y]]) ∼
j
st (c λδ[δ[y ]] + (1 − λ)δ[δ[y  ]]). This is possi-
ble due to continuity of preference ordering. Thus, we have vj(V j(y)) = λvj(V j(y )) +
(1 − λ)vj(V j(y  )). Since  i
st is more risk averse than  
j
st in the ﬁrst stage, we have
(c δ[δ[y]])  i
st (c λδ[δ[y ]] + (1 − λ)δ[δ[y  ]]), which implies vi(V i(y)) ≥ λvi(V i(y )) +
(1−λ)vi(V i(y  )).
Since vi(V i(·)) = vi((V j(·))) =  (vj(V j(·))),w eo b t a i n
 (uj(V j(y))) ≥ λ (uj(V j(y )))+(1−λ) (uj(V j(y  ))) 466 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Onecanchoosey, y ,andy   soastocoverthewholerangeof uj ◦V j.T h u s ,  isconcave.
The proof of the other direction of the proposition is routine. 
Proof of Proposition 5. When we restrict to the subdomain C ×  (L), we immedi-
ately deduce that ambiguity aversion implies risk aversion in the ﬁrst stage. Now, we
consider the reverse statement. Given h+1 h 
+1 ∈ H+1,w ed e ﬁ n ea ∈  (L) as in Deﬁni-





















for all π ∈ Pst,w h e r et h er e l a t i o n st follows from the deﬁnition of risk aversion in the
ﬁrst stage. By Axiom B7 (Dominance), we obtain
(c λδ[h+1]⊕(1−λ)δ[h 
+1])  st (c λδ[h+1]+(1−λ)δ[h 
+1]) 
It follows from the deﬁnition that the decision maker is ambiguity averse. 
Proof of Proposition 6. First, we show that comparative risk aversion in the ﬁrst
stage implies comparative ambiguity aversion. To show that i is more ambiguous averse
than j, we need to show
(c δ[l])  
j
st (c δ[h+1])  ⇒ (c δ[l])  i
st (c δ[h+1])  (43)
Given h+1 ∈ H+1 and μst ∈  (Pst),d e ﬁ n eb(h+1 μst) ∈  (L) as
b(h+1 μst)(L) = μst
 
{π ∈ Pst: l(h+1 π)∈ L}
 
for every Borel set L ⊂ L,w h e r el(h+1 π)=
 
s h+1(s)π(s).
For any preferences { st} satisfying Axioms B1–B7,w eu s eTheorem 3 to compute




























= Vst(c δ[h+1]) 
where we use the change of variables theorem (Aliprantis and Border 1999, p. 452) to
derive the second equality. This implies that (c b(h+1 μst)) ∼st (c δ[h+1]). Likewise, we
have (c b(h 
+1 μst)) ∼st (c δ[h 
+1]).T h u s ,( 43) is equivalent to
(c δ[l])  
j
st (c b(h+1 μ))  ⇒ (c δ[l])  i
st (c b(h+1 μ)) Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 467
This relation holds true because i is more risk averse than j in the ﬁrst stage.
Turn to the proof of the converse statement. Fix a set E ⊂ S such that λ =  
Pst π(E)dμst(π) ∈ (0 1). Suppose (c δ[l])  
j
st (c λδ[l ]+(1 − λ)δ[l  ]) for l l  l   ∈ L.
Let h+1 be the one-step-ahead act that gives l  if event E happens and gives l  , other-
wise. Then by deﬁnition, we can show that b(h+1 μst) = λδ[l ]+(1 − λ)δ[l  ]. Using
the representation in Theorem 3, we can verify that (c b(h+1 μst)) ∼
j
st (c δ[h+1]) or
(c λδ[l ]+(1 − λ)δ[l  ]) ∼
j
st (c δ[h+1]), which implies (c δ[l])  
j
st (c δ[h+1]).B y c o m -
parative ambiguity aversion, we have (c δ[l])  i
st (c δ[h+1]). Since (c λδ[l ]+(1 −
λ)δ[l  ]) ∼i
st (c δ[h+1]) holds as well, we obtain (c δ[l])  i
st (c λδ[l ]+(1 − λ)δ[l  ]).
Hence, we have
(c δ[l])  
j
st (c λδ[l ]+(1−λ)δ[l  ])  ⇒ (c δ[l])  i
st (c λδ[l ]+(1−λ)δ[l  ]) 
We can extend this result to all λ ∈ (0 1) by continuity (Axiom B1)a n dAxiom B4 (First
Stage Independence). We can also extend this result to all ﬁnite lotteries over L by re-
peatedly applying the above argument. We ﬁnally extend it to all lotteries over L by
continuity of preferences (Axiom B1). 
Appendix E: Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 7.D e ﬁ n e
φt(α) = Vt(c +αδ)
for an adapted process (δt). Using (20)–(22), we have
φt(α) = W
 
ct +αδt Rt(Vt+1(c +αδ))
 
 
Taking derivatives in the preceding equation yields
φ 






v  ◦u−1(Eπz t[u(Vt+1)])
u (u−1(Eπz t[u (Vt+1)]))




Deﬁne λt as in (18)a n dEz
t as in (19). We obtain
φ 









where Et is the conditional expectation operator with respect to the predictive distribu-
tion
 




Proof of Proposition 8. When the utility function takes the homothetic form, we
use Proposition7and thedeﬁnitionofthepricing kernel toderive(23). Alternatively, we
may write the pricing kernel in terms of the market return as in Epstein and Zin (1989).468 Hayashi and Miao Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
In a complete market, wealth Xt satisﬁes
Xt = Et









That is, time t wealth is equal to the present value of the consumption stream. By
Lemma 6.25 in Skiadas (2009), we have
Vt = λtXt  (44)





















Eliminating λt from (44)a n d( 45) yields
































As a result, for unitary EIS (ρ = 1), the consumption–wealth ratio is equal to 1−β.





































































































In complete markets, the following Euler equation holds:
Et[Mz
t+1Rt+1]=1 Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Substitution and ambiguity preferences 469

































































so that we can write the pricing kernel as (24). 
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